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Abstract 
This article explores what the financial crisis shows about changes in the German and 
French banking systems, the two largest in continental Europe. In particular, we 
highlight processes of financialization – defined here as the increased trading of risk. 
We focus on an apparent contradiction: Why did the more protectionist and 
conservative German banking system suffer much higher losses than the more 
liberalised French system? This article also examines the responses of German and 
French banks and governments to the crisis and speculates how far these responses 
might limit future financialization and shape national banking systems. 
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Introduction 
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Recent record losses in complex financial instruments have seriously weakened many 
large German banks and brought several near to collapse. French bank losses are 
lower, but still significant. As of August 2008, twelve German and six French banks 
had writedowns of more than $1 billion, totalling US$55.9 billion for these German 
banks and US$23.3 billion for the French (Bloomberg, 2008).1 In both countries, 
banks previously known largely for domestic retail and commercial lending – notably 
largely Land government-owned German Landesbanken (LB) and French mutual 
banks – have revealed major losses across a range of activities. This article explores 
what the crisis shows about any transformation of the German and French banking 
systems, the two largest in continental Europe. In particular, we highlight processes of 
financialization – defined here as the increased trading of risk. We focus on an 
apparent contradiction: Why did the more protectionist and conservative German 
banking system suffer much higher losses than the more liberalised French system? 
This article also examines the responses of German and French banks and 
governments to the crisis and speculates how far these responses might limit future 
financialization and shape national banking systems. 
 
Financialization is defined here as the increased trading of, and exposure to, risk. The 
term is defined in a variety of ways in the IPE literature (see Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 
2005). The usage here is closest to Aglietta and Breton (2001, p.437), although 
financialization is not a term they employ. They link the change from a bank-based to 
a more market-based financial system to financial liberalisation and financial 
innovation linked to technological advance. They and also recognise how banks add a 
‘new market portfolio’ to their ‘traditional credit portfolio’ (2001, p.441). The 
increasing importance of ‘market’ relative to ‘credit’ portfolios, and the implications 
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for the nature of ‘investment banking’ activity at French and German universal banks, 
is central to our analysis. Financialization almost always in practice involves 
internationalisation and, always, the reverse. We understand the financialization of 
banks here in terms of a range of activities, from increasing retail activities 
internationally (a relatively low exposure to risk, depending on the host country) to 
derivatives trading and investment in complex securities.  
 
The German and French financial systems both contain a growing number of non-
bank financial institutions, but banks still dominate. German depository institutions 
held 78.3 percent of total assets in December 2002, only a marginal increase since the 
1980s. In France, there was a more significant relative decline over the previous 
decade, but, in December 2003, depository institutions held 64 per cent of financial 
institution assets (IMF, 2004). The financialization of German and French banking 
systems, rather than increasing activity by other financial market actors, is the more 
important change in the two countries’ financial systems over the past two decades, 
especially, as we discuss below, in the years immediately before the crisis. 
 
We highlight, across all German and French banks, but to significantly varying 
degrees, the increased importance of both internationalisation and trading activities in 
the 2000s. The significance of this for possible change in the banking system in 
Germany and France lies in the nature of banking activities, and therefore the 
potential sources of future profitability. The debate about the reality, nature, 
determinants and pace of change in German banking is of long standing (e.g., Deeg, 
1999; Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004). Our engagement with this debate is narrow, 
following Hackenthal (2004) in considering changes in the activities of the banks 
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themselves through examination of bank balance sheets. We compare the German and 
French banks, showing that the former are at least as, if not more, financialised. 
 
Shifts in national banking systems because of financialization have potential 
implications for German and French models of capitalism, especially the German 
system, where ‘patient’ bank-provided capital has been a core element. In particular, 
the fact that the activities of banks have precipitated a ‘credit crunch’ in a number of 
countries, whereby companies are having difficulty borrowing, demonstrates the 
significance of recent developments to a varieties of financial capitalism literature that 
focuses in large part on how companies finance themselves. While the broader 
implications of such change are beyond the scope of this article, we discuss this 
briefly in the conclusion. 
 
Banking systems in the early 2000s 
Although both systems underwent financialization in the 1980s and 90s, this process 
accelerated rapidly from 2002 to 2007. The German model is traditionally described 
as a three pillar decentralised universal bank-based financial system (Zysman, 1983; 
Deeg, 1999) with large private banks, the public sector savings banks (Sparkassen and 
regional LB) and the cooperatives. The three pillars were (are) separated by financial 
structures, legal status and governance systems. There is a long (though declining) 
tradition of Länder government interference in LB lending decisions and overall 
public sector ownership far exceeds that in comparable economies (IMF, 2003). In the 
1990s, four-fifths of retail and commercial banking activity in Germany was by public 
sector banks, which were seen as specialising in banking for the Mittelstand, 
Germany’s Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. The listed commercial sector has 
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long been dominated by three large, internationally present universal banks 
(Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerzbank). Deeg (1999) and Krahnen and Schmidt 
(2004) emphasise the continued domestic focus of the public sector banks and their 
close relationships with the Mittelstand. However, a fragmented domestic market 
restricted competition and profits, pushing both private banks and the LB increasingly 
abroad to increase profitability. 
 
The largest French banks were all previously state-owned and were privatised from 
1987 to 2002, with the banking system rapidly consolidating in the 1990s. The system 
was (is) dominated by two listed commercial banks – BNP-Paribas and Société 
Générale – and four mutual banks – Crédit Agricole, Banque Populaire, Caisse 
d’Epargne and Crédit Mutuel. Mutual banks are majority-owned by their depositors 
and, at least in principle, operated for their benefit, rather than, as with the listed 
commercial banks, being owned by private shareholders. All banks can opt to become 
universal banks, engaging in the broad range of retail, corporate and investment 
banking activity. Regulation was harmonised across banking types, credit 
specialisation eliminated and most restrictions on competition removed. The 
relationship of French banks with nonfinancial firms – never as close as in Germany – 
became more distant (Bertero, 1994; O’Sullivan, 2007), as France moved from a 
financial network to a financial market form of capitalism (Morin, 1998, 2000). The 
importance of bank finance for French companies declined dramatically, and large 
French banks compensated by developing investment banking, as in Germany. 
However, the comparative strength of French banking was in domestic retail banking, 
and reduced profit also encouraged the largest French banks to expand retail activities 
abroad. This strong retail component to internationalisation is in marked contrast to 
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the German banks, whose internationalisation was almost exclusively in corporate 
lending and investment banking, their traditional areas of expertise. The contrast is 
highly significant to the differential impact of the crisis in the two countries, and is in 
large part explained by the historical fragmentation of the German system.  
 
The French banking system is one of the most concentrated in the EU;  Germany one 
of the least. By the late 1990s, four French banks were in the top 15 European banks 
by asset size, but only one German: Deutsche Bank. More recent figures show that the 
five largest French banks have 52.3 percent of total assets, compared to 22 percent in 
Germany, 26 percent in Italy, 36 percent in the United Kingdom and 40 percent in 
Spain (ECB, 2008). 
 
The German system has been more protectionist and anti-competitive than the French 
in several ways. Until 2005, guarantees against bankruptcy allowed LB to borrow 
more cheaply than commercial rivals; furthermore, the LB and Sparkassen do not 
compete against one another and retain their own fiefdoms. The German government, 
the Association of German Banks, the European Commission and the Bundesbank all 
support the elimination of the three pillar German system but change has been 
strongly resisted by Land governments. With a single legal framework and no sector-
wide anti-competitive practices, the French system is comparatively open. However, 
the provision of some savings products favours the mutual banks (Candida, 2000). 
The dense provision of French retail banking services also makes the entry of foreign 
banks very difficult. Foreign penetration into the German and French banking markets 
is amongst the lowest in the EU. In France, at the end of 2003, foreign banks held 
only 12 percent of bank assets (IMF, 2004, p.103), with German levels similar.  
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The equity ownership of French and German commercial banks presents a different 
picture. Despite cross shareholdings and, particularly in the case of France, perceived 
government antipathy to foreign ownership, during the 1990s, both the German and 
French commercial banks fell under increased foreign ownership, although domestic 
corporate shareholders maintained blocking power.  By the early 2000s, foreigners 
owned 67 percent of BNP-Paribas’ equity capital (2002) and 50.8 percent of Société 
Générale. Developments in Germany were similar, with foreign ownership of 
Deutsche Bank 46 percent (rising to over half in 2007) and of Commerzbank 35 
percent (rising to over three quarters in 2008). Dresdner was in 2001 bought by the 
insurance giant Allianz, itself 32 percent foreign owned (2002). German public and 
cooperative banks and French mutual banks have mostly not opened their capital, but 
Crédit Agricole – one of the largest retail banks in Europe – was partially opened to 
private shareholding in 2001. 
 
Several developments in the late 1980s and 1990s demonstrate the beginning of a 
shift in German and French banking cultures, as banks previously seen as focused on 
the conservative, risk-averse domestic market looked to investment banking and 
abroad to increase profits. German banks first entered into London investment 
banking. Deutsche Bank bought Morgan Grenfell of London in 1989. The other 
commercial banks followed suit in 1995. Then the public bank Westdeutsche LB 
bought West Merchant Bank Ltd., a London advisory firm for privatizations and 
mergers. ‘In 1999, Deutsche ranked first, Dresdner second, and Commerzbank fourth 
among large European universal banks in terms of the portion of total capital that was 
allocated to wholesale and investment banking’ (Hackenthal, 2004, p.77). In 1987, 
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Société Générale started derivatives trading within two months of being the first state-
owned bank privatised. The French mutuals entered into investment banking 
relatively late, with Banque Populaire taking over Natexis in 1999, transforming it 
into an investment bank and, in 2006, merging it with the Caisse d’Epargne’s IXIS to 
form Natixis, one of France’s largest investment banks. In 2004, Crédit Agricole set 
up its corporate and investment banking arm, Calyon.  
 
Two important points emerge from these developments. First, investment banking 
was developed and expanded both by those banks with (increasingly foreign) private 
shareholders and those without. By the mid 2000s, the French mutual banks were 
largely indistinguishable in the range of their operations from the large commercial 
banks. German LB, with their large public shareholders, were also keen to increase 
profits. The LB may be ‘not strictly profit-maximising entities’ (Hackenthal, 2004, 
p.74), but this had no significant impact on their behaviour in this regard. Second, the 
nature of what can be broadly seen as ‘investment’ banking changed over time. The 
initial impetus for the expansion into overseas investment banking may have been to 
acquire skills to assist in serving domestic clients (on Germany, Deeg, 1999). The 
foreign firms purchased were largely advisory fee-earning, not proprietary trading, 
businesses, but over time, as will be discussed in greater detail below, proprietary 
trading increasingly dominated investment banking..   
 
Financialization and the Credit Crisis 
We analyse below the reports and accounts of the main French and German banks. 
First, we consider changes in the banks’ activities from 2002 to 2007. We show the 
(in Germany, dramatic) changes in the importance of trading activities in general, and 
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the trading of derivatives in particular. Our second focus is on the losses made by 
banks in the crisis itself. Of necessity, we concentrate in the first period on those 
activities that are apparent from an analysis of the banks’ balance sheets. The losses 
announced as a result of the crisis reveal activities that were not visible in this way; 
most obviously, sizeable losses resulted from off balance sheet activities. Although 
these investments were not necessarily hidden (Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, for 
example, discusses its Structured Investment Vehicles [SIVs; see Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2007, p.24] in its 2004 accounts), greater detail has now been given.  
 
We reach three conclusions from the data. First, trading activity has increased 
significantly, especially by the German banks, but also the French. In particular, the 
use of derivatives in trading activities has increased very significantly, especially in 
Germany. Derivatives are used to reduce the risks from both credit (e.g., Krahnen and 
Schmidt, 2004, p.510) and interest rate mismatches (Memmel and Schertler, 2009), 
but in most banks analysed the volume of derivatives traded massively exceeds that 
required for balance sheet and financing risk hedging. Nearly all banks that 
distinguish classify derivatives transactions as mainly for trading purposes. Second, 
however, there is no correlation between the use of derivatives and impact of 
announced losses. Some of the greatest victims of the crisis, such as Bayerische 
Landesbank, Industrie Kredietbank (IKB) and Landesbank Sachsen, were not 
especially heavy traders of derivatives, but appear to have been engaged in activities 
that were not enormously profitable but were perceived as safe, notably investment in 
AAA-rated Asset Backed Securities and the contingent risks involved in Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper and SIVs2 (see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p.24). This 
was ‘disaster myopia’ (Guttentag and Herring, 1986). Third, French banks were 
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engaged in many of the same activities as German banks and made substantial, but 
smaller, losses. While those banks that suffered less were perhaps ‘better traders’, the 
main difference is one of degree rather than different practices. Most obviously, 
French banks were far smaller investors in the assets that became toxic, and less 
involved in setting up off balance sheet vehicles. In addition, the large retail banking 
businesses of the French banks lessened the overall impact of the crisis.  
 
Changing Bank Activities Prior to the Crisis: Trading Activity   
The banks’ reports do not give a single way to track increased trading activity, but the 
data all point in the same direction. The available data includes the percentage of total 
assets designated ‘trading assets’, or, more narrowly, the proportion of securities held 
for trading purposes. Table 1 summarises the available data for the French and 
German banks.  
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
For the German LB, the figures, where available, show an increasing focus on trading, 
although by no means consistently across all LB. The average notional volume of 
derivatives across the West German LB also rose from 3.5 times total assets in 2002 
to 4.3 times in 2006 and 2007.3 As would be expected, the importance of trading 
generally and derivatives in particular for Deutsche and Dresdner is higher than other 
German banks, but Commerzbank’s trading assets figures are far lower even than 
many of the LB’s; as much an indication of changing LB activity as of 
Commerzbank’s relative caution. This increased involvement in trading by Deutsche 
and Dresdner, however dramatic, does not represent any change from the general 
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picture of the private banks, but the nature of investment banking, at least for 
Deutsche and Dresdner, has changed, as it has globally, to be focused far more on 
proprietary trading than on providing a wider range of services to clients. The figures 
for the LB are significant. Both Hackenthal and the IMF (2009, p.18) note the 
importance of wholesale funding for the LB, and the resultant vulnerabilities. 
Examination of the asset side of the balance sheet, however, also demonstrates an 
increased vulnerability to market movements. It has been frequently suggested that 
German banking is moving more in the direction of an Anglo-Saxon model. These 
data suggest that in the years leading up to the crisis, the trajectory of that change 
steepened. For a period, this was a successful strategy. Risk-adjusted trading results at 
the largest banks were seen as improving from 2005 until mid-2007. However, after 
that, heavy losses were made (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p.67).  
 
French banks overall are not as heavily involved in trading, relative to total assets that 
included substantial retail operations; nor have they generally experienced the marked 
increase in this activity in Germany. The one exception is BNP Paribas but, even here, 
derivatives activity declined relative to total assets, and notional derivatives volume in 
2008 was 39 percent lower than Deutsche Bank. Elsewhere, however, the picture is 
different. Société Générale (which made heavy losses in derivatives trading) has 
lower trading assets, and derivatives activity relative to total assets closer to 
Commerzbank, and less than a third of Deutsche. Crédit Agricole is comparable to 
both WestLB and DZ Bank. The problems at Natixis were serious, but trading assets 
at Caisse d’Epargne are low (although derivatives activity is higher than most LB). 
Crédit Mutuel has similarly low trading assets, and derivatives activity fell well 
before the crisis. While the French mutuals have become universal banks, they remain 
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more rooted in their retail and commercial banking activities than either the French 
commercial banks or the LB. 
 
French banks nevertheless play a leading role in certain derivatives trading. They 
have over the past two decades consistently engaged in approximately a quarter of 
global equity derivatives trading (Fédération Bancaire de France, 2007). For several 
years Société Générale made greater profits from equity derivatives than any other 
bank globally. When the recipients of collateral postings for credit default swaps by 
AIG (using US government support) were revealed, Société Générale headed the list, 
receiving US$11 billion, 22 percent of the total. Calyon, the Crédit Agricole 
subsidiary, received a further US$2.3 billion. Named German banks received US$7.7 
billion. Nevertheless, relative to the (generally larger) size of the French banks, the 
volume of derivatives trading is lower. Unlike the German banks, the average volume 
of derivative trading appears to have barely risen from 2002 to 2007 (although figures 
are incomplete). This was a period of rapid expansion for BNP Paribas and Société 
Générale, but the expansion was at least as much in the area of international retail 
banking as trading activity.  
   
Internationalisation  
German bank internationalisation also demonstrates rapid change in recent years. The 
nature of internationalisation is somewhat obscured by the presentation in some 
financial reports, particularly not separating Germany from the rest of Western 
Europe. We focus on credit exposure (contained generally in the risk reports in the 
annual reports) rather than revenue, because revenue is generally categorised by the 
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geographic entity where a risk is actually recorded. LB Sachsen’s US sub-prime 
exposure, for example, was largely incurred by a Dublin-based subsidiary.  
 
The available data support two observations. First, internationalisation on the asset 
side of the balance sheet has been very significant, and has accelerated in recent years. 
Second, although European financial integration should be expected to result in 
increased euro area exposure outside the home market,, the increase in exposure 
outside Europe, particularly in North America, is at least as significant as any increase 
in lending in the euro area.4 The available data is set out in Table 2. 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
Amongst the large private banks, data limitations prevent a full comparison. 
Commerzbank and Dresdner appear more European focused in their activities, but 
Deutsche has nearly half its exposure outside Western Europe, suggesting exposure in 
Germany must be well under half of total exposure. The situation of Société Générale 
is similar, but over half of BNP-Paribas’ assets remain in France. French bank 
internationalisation has included, in the cases of BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole and 
Société Générale, expansion in retail banking, particularly in Italy. BNP Paribas, 
which has 6000 branches outside France, owns BNL, the sixth largest Italian bank, 
and BancWest, a US retail bank. Crédit Agricole has considered Greece and Italy to 
be ‘domestic’ markets since its takeover in 2006 of major retail banks there. As of end 
2008, Société Générale’s international retail banking consisted of 40 different entities 
with 3700 branches. In stark contrast,German banks’ international expansion has been 
concentrated on investment banking (although Commerzbank, for example, engages 
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in retail banking in Central and Eastern Europe). This greater focus of French banks 
on retail activities does not preclude future problems, especially in Eastern Europe, 
but the overall level of financialization in this internationalisation is lower. 
      
Again, the most dramatic changes are at the LB (despite considerable diversity). 
Lending to their home Land cannot be isolated, except for the probably anomalous LB 
Sachsen,5 but the available figures demonstrate significantly increased 
internationalisation. The process of internationalisation Deeg (1999) highlights has 
continued at an accelerating rate. These figures are, once again, difficult to reconcile 
with the view of LB as prioritising the needs of a home region. They are also hard, 
along with so many of the activities highlighted here, to reconcile with LB as ‘not 
strictly profit-maximising entities’ (Hackenthal, 2004, p.74). The absence of private 
shareholder pressure did not prevent, for example, LB Sachsen in 2003 setting a target 
for return on equity higher than was then being achieved by Deutsche Bank 
(Kirchfeld and Simmons, 2008).There is also no reason to see French mutual banks as 
not profit maximising, but they remain overwhelmingly domestic institutions.  
 
This analysis shows that the view of the German banks as more conservative, as befits 
a bank-based financial system, does not hold. German banks are at least as 
financialised as, if not more financialised than, French banks operating in what is 
generally seen as now a deregulated, more market-based system. The high leverage of 
German banks is well-documented, and the gap between leverage and regulatory 
capital requirements is high, thanks to the favourable treatment of many highly-rated 
assets and derivatives positions (IMF, 2009, p.14). This has in itself created 
vulnerabilities in the current crisis. However, the analysis above takes this further. 
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The banks have also been more heavily involved in trading rather than lending, and 
significantly more internationalised. There has been a global trend in investment 
banking towards proprietary trading, but that the LB are,in this sense, ‘the same as 
everyone else’, in itself challenges the traditional perception of them. 
 
We have so far concentrated on changes in the banks’ activities as shown in the 
banks’ balance sheets. However, the financial crisis reveals that many risks taken 
have been either largely hidden on the balance sheet or were off balance sheets 
altogether. In this area, differences between French and German banks are also 
marked.   
 
Analysing the Banks’ Losses 
Recent European bank losses offer an unusual opportunity to examine the nature of 
banking. The crisis has obviously been an enormous surprise, but that ‘traditionally 
conservative’ German banks have made around a quarter of Europe’s writedowns 
(IMF, 2009,p.12) has been a further shock. Table 3 sets out German and French bank 
losses until end August 2008,6 and the announced areas of those losses, sourced from 
banks’ reports and accounts. They therefore show what the banks deemed material 
enough to highlight. These data are possibly partial, but are very likely to highlight 
the main areas of loss. These figures can obviously only be preliminary. Leaked 
figures from the German regulator, Bafin, suggest still higher losses on ‘toxic assets’ 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 April 2009), and French banks have also continued to 
announce losses. Nevertheless, the crisis already reveals much about banks’ activities; 
it also has the potential to bring about substantial change.  
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<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
The crisis has not hit the largest or most sophisticated banks hardest. The most 
severely affected, Hypo Real Estate, IKB and LB Sachsen (all of whom effectively 
collapsed) are relatively small, and, measured by their activity in the derivatives 
market, less involved in the trading of the most sophisticated products. HRE is 
possibly an individual case, because so many of its problems stem from the funding of 
Depfa Bank, but the other two suffered losses mainly from their ABCP and SIVs (see 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p.24, 49; Tett, 2009). This is an area where the French 
banks have not experienced significant losses (although BNP Paribas has a large 
exposure). Even without including LB Sachsen, average losses of the LB included are 
0.645 percent of assets, significantly higher than the large German or French private 
banks (0.40 and 0.28 percent respectively).   
 
The data highlight the range of bank activities in both countries. The multiple sources 
of losses at the large commercial banks is unsurprising, but further demonstrates that 
‘investment banking’ is increasingly proprietary trading. This is true also of the 
French commercial banks, but French losses are significantly lower. At times, French 
banks appeared to be at the forefront of the crisis in Europe. In August 2007, BNP 
Paribas froze three investment funds. In January 2008, Société Générale announced 
losses of €4.9 billion – the largest in banking history – through rogue trading in 
derivatives. Yet in 2008 both BNP Paribas and Société Générale reported profits. 
French bank losses compare very favourably with those at Citigroup ($55.1bn) and 
UBS ($44.2bn) (Bloomberg 2008). 
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It is LB’s losses that most question the more standard view, and further reinforce the 
claim of dramatic change. The losses made are clearly in areas far from regionally-
based lending. The exposure of LB to off balance sheet structures, for example, has 
been estimated by Moody’s at around US$55 billion. The vast majority is likely to be 
financing the US mortgage market.  In contrast, although French mutual banks made 
losses across a range of activities, with problems at Natixis particularly acute, losses 
so far reported are far lower. This is in line with the expectations from their lower 
financialization. French banks (or indeed any banks) did not predict the crisis better, 
but their more diversified risk, especially greater involvement in retail banking, has 
reduced the overall impact. German banks, meanwhile, were not primarily focused on 
patient domestic lending, but were in fact more exposed to market movements than 
their French counterparts. The change in their activities has been even more 
pronounced than generally recognised.    
 
Government Action 
 
Intervention by both governments is unprecedented, propping up ailing banks and 
boosting confidence in the banking sector; responding with credit guarantees; bail-
outs through loans; purchasing minority shares or nationalising out-right; coordinated 
or enforced mergers; conditions on remuneration; tighter regulation and pushing for 
reinforced regulatory frameworks at the European and international levels. French 
government action has been more proactive, suggesting a throw-back to an earlier 
interventionism. With a couple of noteworthy exceptions, the German approach so far 
been more voluntary, but may be moving towards compulsion (Die Zeit, 19 February 
2009 Nr. 09; Spiegel Online, 20 July 2009). However, despite the rhetoric of a return 
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to a more ‘moral capitalism’ (in France), the regulatory push in both countries and 
interventions, the impact of government action upon financialization is likely to be 
limited. 
 
Credit guarantees and loans to banks have been provided by the German (federal) and 
French governments to calm markets and encourage lending, as in many EU countries 
(see Quaglia, 2009). The German federal government approach has been more hands 
off than in France, the UK or the US, allowing banks to decide for themselves on 
assistance from the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (FMSF) created in mid-
October 2008. The fact that so many of the troubled banks have been able to turn in 
the first instance to their Länder shareholders for assistance so far has limited the use 
of the FMSF, but the LB remain keen to utilize the federal government’s ‘bad’ bank 
scheme if agreement can be reached. A few transactions have been completed, 
notably Commerzbank (twice) and HRE. In the autumn of 2008, the French 
government moved to recapitalise all the largest national banks, effectively forcing 
them to accept capital and commit to increase domestic lending. In January 2009, 
further conditions were attached to a second tranche of capital, including curbs on 
dividend payments, a ban on executive bonuses for 2008 and export lending. 
However, none of the conditions have restricted French banks’ trading activities. 
 
Both governments have extended their ownership in several banks. In Germany, the 
federal government-owned KfW became a majority shareholder in IKB and 
orchestrated a bail-out involving other banks. Commerzbank has tapped the new 
FMSF twice to save the merger with Dresdner Bank, for a total in equity and loan 
guarantees of €33.2 billion (Handelsblatt, 11 May 2009). A ‘nationalisation by 
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another name’ (Financial Times 9 January 2009), with a stake that is, by value, the 
largest crisis-induced shareholding of any leading European government in a private 
bank (Spiegel Online, 20 January 2009), the bail outs give the federal government a 
25 percent plus 1 share in the new entity and veto power on some major company 
decisions. The German government also opted for the full nationalisation of HRE 
against the preference of its US investor, JC Flowers, but the HRE situation is 
unusually severe, and the government offered to buy shares at above the prevailing 
market price. Nationalisation met with considerable ideological opposition in the 
German political class and legislative change – agreed in February 2009 – was 
necessary. Yet, with the exception of HRE – a comparatively small institution – the 
German government’s involvement in bank management to date has been negligible, 
and shareholders have generally not faced dilution as a result of federal government 
action, as in the UK. This preference for a hands-off and voluntary approach is very 
much is line with the industry-led response to crisis in Germany highlighted in the 
varieties of financial capitalism literature (e.g., Zysman, 1983; Deeg, 1999). The 
German government has preferred to act according to type. In France, increased 
government ownership in banks aimed less at rescuing institutions than at ensuring 
the continuation of domestic lending. In April 2009, the government increased the 
state’s share in BNP-Paribas to over 17 percent while foregoing voting rights. The 
President’s office also directed the merger of Caisse d’Epargne and Banque Populaire 
and took a substantial shareholding. Controversially, the President’s top economic 
advisor took charge of the new bank. Despite calls by government leaders for direct 
intervention in the new bank’s direction,  the impact of increased government control 
remains as yet unseen. 
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The European Commission’s response to government intervention under EU State 
Aid rules will force change upon some banks. The Commission dropped its initial 
demand that French banks cut operations in exchange for capital following assurances 
that government funds would be used only to increase lending to mitigate the credit 
crunch. However, the Commission’s position on the regional bailouts of four LB – 
WestLB, Bayerische LB, HSH Nordbank and LBBW – and of Commerzbank could 
have more far-reaching effects. In May 2009, the Commission agreed a restructuring 
plan with WestLB that will halve assets by March 2011, including both international 
and domestic assets. Thus the actual overall impact of restructuring upon the relative 
importance of investment banking activities may be limited. WestLB is not being 
forced to refocus its activities at the domestic level. The three other LB face similar 
restructuring plans. 
 
Both German and French governments have used the crisis to push for further 
consolidation and the construction of national banking champions. This drove policy 
on the Caisse d’Epargne and Banque Populaire merger – which would likely have 
failed without a government ultimatum. BNP-Paribas’ takeover of the Belgian and 
Luxembourg sections of Fortis bank – assisted but not directed by the French 
government – will make it the euro area’s largest bank. The relative stability that 
consolidation brings may well encourage ongoing financialization, but BNP-Paribas is 
also substantially increasing its retail operations. In Germany, the federal 
government’s voluntary ‘bad bank’ plan to take on toxic assets involved loose 
conditions imposed on the LB seeking to participate to downsize their operations and 
merge into fewer banks – with details left to the LB. However, the determined 
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opposition of Land governments and the politicisation of the issue at the federal level1 
may well undermine these efforts.  
 
Both French and German governments and regulators have moved to tighten 
regulation and supervisory controls on banks. French regulatory changes are more 
focused upon risks associated with rogue trading (Banking Commission, 2008) and 
will have no impact on financialization. In Germany, the resolution of debates 
regarding the regulatory response to the crisis is only marginally more likely to have 
any impact on financialization. There has been much criticism of the division of 
regulatory responsibilities between the Bundesbank and Bafin for contributing to the 
inability of these bodies to supervise banks effectively and predict their exposure to 
the financial crisis (IMF 2008). However, recent efforts to clarify their responsibilities 
seem unlikely to have an impact on banking activities. However, other German 
changes appear more potentially constraining. In March 2009, the federal cabinet 
approved a draft bill on regulatory reform (the Gesetz zur Verstärkung der 
Finanzmarkt- und Versicherungsaufsicht) which was passed in the federal parliament 
on 10 July 2009. The law includes enhanced capital requirements for securitization, 
increasing capital and liquidity reserves above Basel II requirements; binding limits 
on interbank exposures; increased reporting requirement of banks’ off balance sheet 
exposure; and reporting requirements on bank leverage ratios (including off balance 
sheet assets). The new reserve rules and limits on interbank lending both have the 
potential to limit financialization. The adoption of reporting requirements on leverage 
aims to correct a perceived weakness in Basel II, which allows limited capital against 
assets with high credit ratings. That has allowed many banks, particularly in Germany 
                                                
1 Financial Times, 21 June 2009 
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(IMF, 2009a, p.13) but also elsewhere in Europe, to become highly leveraged despite 
meeting international capital adequacy rules. However, the new German law stopped 
short of adopting a maximum gross-leverage ratio which would limit the size of bank 
balance sheets relative to capital, as exists in Canada. This option is increasingly 
preferred by European central bankers as a simple mechanism to curb excessive risk-
taking. Moreover, neither national government appears prepared to impose tighter 
requirements on the definition of capital held to satisfy Basel II requirements. The 
much reported German and French regulatory push at the European and International 
levels has focused upon bank reporting obligations and greater regulatory 
cooperation, either at the EU level as a result of the creation of the European Systemic 
Risk Council or bilaterally between national regulators (see Bafin, 2008, p. 12) but 
does not seek to place additional constraints on trading activities per se. The long-
standing French and German focus on hedge fund regulation has meanwhile 
continued. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the past two decades a range of German and French banks engaged increasingly 
in investment banking and internationalised. German and French financial systems 
remain (overwhelmingly) bank-based systems. There has been no rapid rise in French 
and German private equity firms and hedge funds, although these do exist. Much of 
the recent change is in the financialization of the banks themselves, rather than 
changes in the extent to which they dominate the financial system. In France, for 
example, the largest hedge funds are bank owned (EuroHedge, 2008). The German 
banking system has been hit harder by the financial crisis than the less financialised 
French, the leading banks of which have nonetheless suffered significant losses. The 
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scaling down of some trading activities amidst the rhetoric of governments and many 
banks themselves for a necessary ‘return’ to traditional banking activities represents a 
time-honoured, and most likely time-limited, response to business problems. A retreat 
to the more cautious nationally-oriented banking of the past is highly unlikely in all 
but the very short term: the opportunities in domestic markets are limited and the lure 
of profits in risk-taking remains. Both French and German banks – commercial, 
public and mutual banks – sought to expand their foreign and trading operations in 
order to increase profitability after the difficult years of the mid-1990s.  
 
The crisis has not brought substantial changes in the nature of the French banking 
system. The state has emerged as a substantial shareholder, in the case of BNP Paribas 
the largest, but without voting rights. The merger of Caisse d’Epargne et Banque 
Populaire appears something of a throw-back to state interventionism. However, 
despite government rhetoric to the contrary, micromanagement of the bank appears 
unlikely. Rather the merger should be seen as an opportunistic move to further 
concentrate the banking system – by 2008 only 450 credit institutions continued to 
operate in the country down from 975 in 2002 (Fédération Bancaire de France, 2009). 
As in Germany, any impact on financialization is likely to be short-term with a 
scaling back of trading activities across the system, most obviously with the 
withdrawal from certain activities of Natixis and Calyon. However, the more broad-
based French business model has been vindicated, and while banks such as BNP-
Paribas and Crédit Mutuel have taken advantage of the crisis to internationalise 
further, there has been a heavy retail element to this expansion.  
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In Germany, the picture remains less clear. The federal government has taken a major 
shareholding in Commerzbank, but appears unlikely to interfere greatly (IMF, 2009, 
p.18). The government’s ‘bad bank’ plan to clear toxic assets remains at this stage 
voluntary. The government appears to want its ownership of HRE to be brief. 
However, the more direct intervention now being considered by a government 
comprising both the major parties, even if a response to the worst financial crisis since 
the 1930s (when the German government took large shareholdings in commercial 
banks) and even if motivated in large part by short-term electoral considerations, 
would represent a significant change in the German financial system, the longer term 
implications of which are unclear. The key uncertainty about the future shape of the 
German financial system, and its ‘three pillars’, nevertheless concerns the LB, whose 
medium-term outlook Standard & Poor’s has termed ‘bleak’ (9 June 2009). Their 
savings bank shareholders support consolidation, the federal government appears 
determined to exact consolidation in return for participation in the bad bank scheme, 
and the heads of both the Bundesbank and the financial regulator, Bafin, are reported 
to favour consolidation (Reuters, 28 September 2008). Länder governments seek to 
maintain their influence, and their heavy involvement in LB recapitalisations has 
increased their overall shareholdings at the expense of the savings banks (Spiegel 
Online, 27 May 2009). However, the capacity of the Länder to continue to intervene 
is being questioned (on the rescue of HSH Nordbank, see Handelsblatt, 24 February 
2009). Further pressure comes from the EU, whose approval is required for any 
support. It is important to recognise, however, that the LB have been here before. 
Consolidation has been a constant (and frequently thwarted) theme since the late 
1960s (Deeg, 1999). 
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The strategies of many LB currently involve a return to their core competencies, 
focusing on their regions, and the Mittelstand at the expense of international trading 
ambitions. This ‘back to basics’ response mirrors closely the response of WestLB to 
problems in principal finance in the early 2000s. The 2003 annual report promised 
that ‘risky, high-volume investments involving significant lending exposures will no 
longer be a part of our business activities’. In June 2009, WestLB said it sought to 
remove €80 billion of ‘toxic assets’ from its balance sheet (Wall Street Journal 
Europe, 9 June 2009). There have been substantial changes in the business models of 
nearly all LB in recent years, and despite regulatory changes that may apply more 
stringent capital requirements, it would appear likely that the medium term will 
continue to see greater financialization, with internationalisation an important part of 
that process. Consolidation, despite Länder opposition, is similarly only going in one 
direction. Larger LB, with even further loosened ties to a particular region (and 
perhaps, as the IMF (2009) recommends, private sector shareholders) seem likely 
only to speed up financialization. 
 
This article has studied the extent to which financialization has reshaped the German 
and French banking systems since 2002. Broader claims can also be made about the 
impact of financialization upon varieties of capitalism in the two countries, although a 
full study of this lies beyond this article. The financialization of German commercial 
banks and the LB has undermined the central position of the banks in the German 
model of capitalism: while German banks looked abroad for profits, large German 
firms turned increasingly to foreign banks and alternative shareholders. Deeg (1999) 
outlines the early stages of this development in the 1990s yet argues that bank-
Mittelstand ties were not affected. The further financialization of LB activities in the 
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2000s, however, has affected these ties: real lending activity is flat and considerably 
lower in relation to total assets. In 1997, 45 percent of LB assets were in domestic 
lending to nonfinancial companies with only 4 percent going to foreign firms. In 
January 2002, the figures were 34 and 10 percent and by 2009, 28 and 17 percent. At 
this point, holdings of non-bank foreign securities were an additional 6 percent of 
assets.7 While the Sparkassen and Cooperative banks stepped in to fill much of the 
gap, this change in LB activities represents a significant shift. The Mittelstand has 
recently been feeling the impact of the credit crunch brought about by the problems in 
German banking. Still, the Mittelstand has not yet turned to equity capital and the 
inroads made by foreign lenders in the German system, while increasing to the end of 
2008 (IMF, 2009,p.32), remain relatively limited and may shrink as a result of the 
financial crisis. Thus, it is important not to overstate the significance of these trends. 
 
The financialization of French banks may have contributed to the unravelling of the 
cross-shareholding groups created in the 1990s and centred around the three largest 
banks, but the crucial transformation in France remains the move to a ‘financial 
market’ form of capitalism, as large French companies turned to the equity markets 
for finance and French banks looked abroad and to other activities to compensate 
(Morin, 1998, 2000). Financialization has nonetheless potentially undermined the 
patient capital that underpinned the cross-shareholding groups. At the same time, 
French business has not turned to foreign banks. The country is open to foreign banks. 
However, nearly all of these operate in niche markets. HSBC's purchase of CCF and 
its retail operations in 2000 has, to date, proven exceptional rather than the start of a 
new trend. Banque Populaire’s purchase of HSBC’s French retail operations in 2008 
moves the country in the opposite direction.  
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The French banking system has been relatively little affected by the financial crisis 
and there is unlikely to be a significant shift either because of the banks’ own strategic 
responses or government intervention. The French system will continue its present 
trajectory of increased financialization and gradual consolidation. The German 
banking system seems far more affected and the crisis may accelerate some of the 
trends already encouraged by financialization – notably LB mergers and the further 
loosening of regional ties. It remains to be seen whether LB and Länder government 
opposition will succeed, as in the past, in slowing systemic change. 
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1 The total assets of the banks involved in the two countries is broadly similar (end 
2007 except March 2008 for IKB). 
2 Both ABCP and SIVs are off-balance sheet entities that buy assets like mortgage-
backed securities, and finance the purchases through issuing debt, mainly short term. 
Bank’s exposure comes from either holding the debt issued or through committing to 
provide financing if the debt cannot be sold. 
3 Total assets is a measure of the size of a bank, so these increases are significant. 
4 Note, however, that the data generally obscures the euro area by categorising only 
Western Europe. 
5 LB Sachsen was established in East Germany only in 1992. 
6 From Bloomberg, 2008. Bloomberg gives no figure for Heleba, so figures up to 
September 2008 are used (source: IMF, 2009, p.13). 
7 Authors’ calculations from Bundesbank figures. 
